A Security analysis of Browser Extensions

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Presentation flow

Introduction to extensions.

Extension Security

Threat model

Methodology

Demos

Statistics

Solution and Conclusions

Browser Extensions

Add functionality to a browser

Written by a third party

Improve the browser experience

Extension security

Google Chrome uses a three step model:

- Isolated worlds: An extension's content scripts cannot access the direct DOM (Document Object Model) of the current running page, but access a copy of it. The javascript execution of content-scripts is kept completely separate from the execution of the page's actual javascript code, if any.
- Privilege separation: Core extension scripts have access to the chrome native APIs. Content scripts do not.
- *Permissions*: Extensions are required to pre-declare their needed privileges, and are limited to those by the browser.

Opera provides limited (common) privileges to all extensions.

Chrome Extension Model




Figure 1: The architecture of a Google Chrome extension.

Threats

Malicious Extensions: An attacker could install a malicious extension in the browser that could, theoretically, cause a lot of damage.

Extension Vulnerabilities: The extension could in itself be vulnerable.

- Insecure Coding practices
- Developer negligence or incompetence

Method of analysis

Silent extension installation

Source code analysis


Pre-install analysis of extensions

Silent Installation

Browsers allow third party application developers to *silently* install extensions in the browser. (Think Ask Toolbar)

Both Google Chrome & Firefox make the user confirm the installation by giving a UI prompt on next restart.

We work-around this prompt to prove that complete silent installation is possible.



Another program on your computer would like to modify Firefox with the following add-on:



BlackSheep 1.7.2

By Julien Sobrier

 $Location: C:\Users\jsobrier\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\...$



Install add-ons only from authors whom you trust.

Allow this installation

DEMO

Silent Extension Installation

Statistics: Content-Security Policy

Content-Security Policy is known to reduce extension vulnerabilities by enforcing stronger coding practices.

It is only available on a "setting" called Manifest Version=2 on Chrome, though.

It will get deployed to every extension on Chrome by September 2013.

We found 4079/9558 extensions using CSP

Statistics: Privilege abuse


Principle of least privileges

Match Permissions sought by an extension by those actually used

Almost 50% of analysed extensions asked for at least one extra permission

Very sensitive information, like browser cookies, were sought in multiple instances.

Number of extra privileges sought	Number of violating extensions
1	3237
2	923
3	250
4	92
5	52
6	19
7	5
8	6
9	9
10	0
11	0
12	1
13	2
14	3
15	1
16	2



Statistics: Network vulnerability

We found at-least 146 extensions making a network request to javascript files over HTTP.

HTTP requests can be attacked by a MitM attack and replaced with malicious javascript.

Furthermore extensions could be making XHR or other network requests over HTTP that we are not aware of.

Extension checker

Pre-checks the extension's API usage and reports it to the user.

Chrome Webstore Extension Analysis

Permissions Being Asked:

```
[0] => bookmarks
[1] => chrome://favicon/
[2] => clipboardRead
[3] => clipboardWrite
[4] => contextMenus
[5] => cookies
[6] => fileBrowserHandler
[7] => geolocation
[8] => history
[9] => idle
[10] => management
[11] => notifications
[12] => tabs
[13] => tts
[14] => unlimitedStorage
[15] => webNavigation
[16] => webRequest
[18] => http://*/*
[19] => https://*/*
```

Permissions Being Used:

```
Array (
    [0] => extension )
```

Difference

```
Array
(
[0] => bookmarks
[1] => chrome://favicon/
```

Solution and Conclusion

- Our extensions checker provides information about the authenticity of an extension.
- Any extension with more than 6 permissions sought should be manually reviewed.
- Content-Security-Policy be made mandatory for all extensions.