A Game between Adversary and Al Scientist

Satnam, Arunabha, Deepak, Waseem, Nirmesh, Santosh, Balamurali, Narayana Acalvio Technologies



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Who am I



- At Acalvio from Day 1
- 15+ Years in DS, ML, AI
- General Motors, Samsung Research, CA Technologies
- Author- Patents, Tech Pubs and Tech Talks
- Rock Climber



Define the Problem

A possible solution - research work

Demos

Under the hood

Problem

Can we play a game with adversary?

Can we engage with adversary?

Is adversary visible to defender?

- Extensive reconnaissance of target and defender

- Using the same tools and techniques as defender

Is he a "Returning" Adversary?

—> Compare Tools, Tactics and Procedures (TTPs)

InfoSec Game: Assumptions



• Unlike Chess, cyber game has infinite state space

--> Use Mitre ATT@CK model to define the state space

Adversary Tactics



Mitre ATT@CK Model

APT 1	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Host Enumeration	Lateral Movement	Execution	C2	Exfiltration
APT 10		vitimate Credenti	ale	Cradantial	Account	Application	Command	Commonly	Automated
18	Accossibilit	y Easturas	Binary	Dumping	Account	deployment	Line	used port	or scripted
APT	Accession	ny realures	Padding	Orestantials		software		Comm	exfiltration
28	Addivid		DLL Side-	Credentials	File system	Exploitation	File Access	through	Data
ADT	DLL Search G	Order Hijack	Loading	In Flies	enumeration	of	PowerShell	removable	compressed
20 APT	Edit Default File Handlers		Security	Network	Group	Vulnerability	Process	media	encrypted
29	New Service		Tools	Sniffing	permission	Logon	Hollowing	Custom	Data size
APT	Path Interception		File System	User	enumeration	Pass the	Registry	application	limits
30	Scheduled Task		Logical	Interaction	Local	hash	Rundll32	layer	Data staged
	Service File Permission Weakness		Offsets		network	Pass the	Scheduled	Custom	Exfil over C2
			Process		connection	ticket Peer	Task	encryption	channel
	Shortcut M	odification	Hollowing		enumeration	connections	Service	cipher	Exfil over
	BIOS	Bypas	s UAC		Local	Remote	Manipulation	Data	alternate
	Diot	DLL In	jection		networking	Desktop	Third Party	obfuscation	channel to
	Hypervisor	Exploitation	Indicator		enumeration	Protocol	Software	channels	C2 network
	ROOLKIL	of	blocking on		Operating	Windows m	anagement	Multiband	Extil over
	Logon Scripts	Vulnerability	host		system	instrum	entation	comm	otner
	Master Boot		Indicator		enumeration	Window	s remote	Multilayer	medium
	Record		removal from		Owner/Llear	manac	siement	Peer	Exfil over
			Indicator		owner/oser	Remote		connections	EXIII Over
	Mod. Exist'g		removal from		Brasses	Services		Standard app	priysical
	Service		host		Process	Replication	1	layer	
	Registry Run		Masquerad-		enumeration	through		protocol	From local
	neys		ing		Security	removable		Standard	system
	Serv. Reg. Perm.		NIFS		software	media		non-app	From
	Weakness		Extended		enumeration	Shared		nayer	network
	Windows Mgmt		Obfuscated		Service	Taint shared	-	Standard	resource
	Instr. Event		Pavload		enumeration	content		encryption	From
	Subsc. Winlogon Helpor		Rootkit		Window	Windows		cipher	removable
	DLL		Rundll32		enumeration	admin		Uncommonly	media
			Scripting			shares]	used port	Scheduled
			Software						transfer
			Packing						

Defender's Tools are at Perimeter



Need new tools to detect adversary INSIDE the NETWORK

Deceptions in Enterprise



Deceptions (D)

- Emulations of Hosts, Applications, Database Servers, etc.
- Real VM Hosts, Applications, etc.
- Browser Cookies, Registry entries, etc.
- Vulnerability in OS/ Application, Shares, etc.





Game: Demos

1: Recon - nmap

Adversary



Defender



 Adversary performs recon and nmap to find out to the neighbourhood

 Defender detects it and provides a few RDP credentials on the endpoints

Demo>>

2: Obfuscated PowerShell Script

Adversary



Defender



 Adversary obfuscates
PowerShell attack and executes in another host Defender detects obfuscated PowerShell commands



3: Credentials Dump using PowerSploit and Mimikatz

Adversary



Defender



- Attacker dumps credentials using PowerSpoit and Mimikartz
- Defender detects PowerSploit and Mimikartz activities



4: Data Exfilteration via DNS Tunnel

Adversary



Defender



 Adversary uses DNS Tunnel using DNSCat2 to exfiltrate the credentials

 Defender detects the DNS tunnel using AI



Under the Hood

High Interaction AI Engine





HISH AI: HIDS Log Summarisation



File Event Logs

HISH-AI: Summarisation Engine



Attack Scenarios	Input Logs	Output Notables
Incident 1	60K	16
Incident 2	6K	5
Incident 3	70K	6

HISH-AI: PowerShell Log Engine



HISH-AI:Data exfiltration using DNS Tunnel



HISH-AI: DNS Tunnel Detection



DNS tunnel detection output:

- IP and domain of tunnelling server: dnstunnel.com
- tunnel start time: 26-02-2018 19:43:37
- tunnel end time: 26-02-2018 19:53:37

Game Theory

Formally Defining A Game

Defining Game - The Normal Form

Finite 2-person normal form game: <N,A,u>:

- Players: N={Adversary, Defender} is a finite set of 2 players, indexed by i

- Action set for player i — Ai

a={a₁,...,a_n}

- Utility function or Payoff function for player i: ui

 $u = (u_1, \ldots, u_n)$ is a profile of utility functions

InfoSec Game

Adversary

		Carry out attack	Quit
Defender	Allow the attack	1,2	2,1
	Block the adversary	2,2	2,0

- "Row" player is Defender, "column" player is Adversary
- Too simplistic
- How to scale it for the real world?
- How do we learn in real time?

Model as Reinforcement Learning Problem



- Break the problem into Subproblems and learn in real-time
- Model it as Reinforcement Learning Problem



Playing a game needs "Visibility" of the adversary

Need to surface signal in low SNR

 Fusion of Deception+AI gives a way to engage with the adversary

Questions?

